Note for the File: Evacuation from Malakal and other
adventures - 8 Feb 2007
On Monday, 27 November 2006, I flew with a small
group to Malakal – the capital of the state of Upper Nile
– and from there on to a town called Longochok, in the east near the wetlands
towards the Ethiopian border. Petrodar, the Chinese consortium, has found oil
in Longocok and we went -- accompanied
by a bright and dynamic female MP -- to investigate the impact this oil
“development” was having on the indigenous people in the area. The company had
drilled and capped 4 oil wells, which have not yet gone into production, but
one pond of waste has reportedly been responsible for the death of about 100
cows which drank from the waste water.
According to the wealth sharing section of the CPA – the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement of Sudan – developers are supposed to consult the local
communities in the areas where they work and to come to agreement with them on
compensation, should the people be displaced from their land or otherwise be
affected. And, benefits of the oil “developments” – in the form of schools,
clinics, jobs – are supposed to accrue to the community. Of course, no such
consultation occurred. The Company just came in with its own security forces,
went where they wanted, drilled where there wanted. None of the community have
been employed as Petrodar brought in its own workers from the North. The next
day, on Tuesday, we were to visit another community in Upper
Nile – in Melut – where oil production has started. But,
meanwhile, we flew back to Malakal and were hanging out in the UNMIS compound –
in the container shared by UNMIS Protection and UNMIS Human Rights -- waiting to see where there was space for us
to be accommodated that night. I tried to check my email, but the network was
down, a common phenomenon.
At around 17.00, we were informed that we
couldn’t move out of HQ for the present because an SPLA soldier had been shot
by someone from one of the armed militias that were still operating in
Malakal. According to the CPA, these
militias – known as OAGs (Other Armed Groups), were supposed to have made a
choice of aligning themselves either to the SPLA (the forces of South Sudan) or to SAF (Sudan Armed Forces) and to have
been integrated into one or the other armies. That has still not happened in
many places including in Malakal, where at least two strong militias were
operating as autonomous units, albeit with support from SAF and Khartoum: one
under a charismatic leader, Gabriel Tang, who also had aspirations to become
Commissioner of Fangak County (in the neighbouring state of Jonglei) which put
him into conflict with local politicos, and one under a commander, Thomas
Mabor, who a former US marine reportedly described as “one of the scariest men
he had ever met”. But I was largely unaware of all of this as I sat chatting to
a colleague.
Around 18.15, we heard a rat-a-tat-tat,
very much like fire-crackers or radio static, and then a few loud thunderclaps.
The static was machine guns – the booms either mortars or RPG (rocket-propelled
grenades), and the rumbles were either tanks moving or APC (armoured personnel
carriers) – you see you need to learn a whole new vocabulary to understand an
unfolding armed conflict. The containers that house the offices of UNMIS are –
like all containers – just thin sheets of metal. So we all dived under the
desks and waited. The shooting, however, got worse and louder – and after about
an hour, a colleague ran into the container and told us to grab our stuff and
follow him – I picked up by backpack and ran, stooped – to the main building
which was hard-walled. There we milled around trying to find out what was
happening.
Noone had particularly good information –
but bits and pieces came in. We had heard that one of the UN drivers had been wounded by flying
shrapnel and had been taken to hospital. That SPLA had opened up with force on
the militias, who were being supported by SAF. That about 150 civilians were
seeking refuge at one of our camps. That the level 2 hospital reported 21
injured patients and two DOAs.
While the escalation between parties had
been reported for over a month – and so there should have been some advanced
planning for the eventuality of open conflict, apparently there was no office
security/evacuation plan in place. Thus, a security plan was drawn up on the
spot at an emergency meeting that Monday evening. The plan included evacuating staff to Juba, Rumbek or El Obeid the next day, if the security situation permitted that. Meanwhile, a decision was taken that all of us at UNMIS should go in a conveoy with APC's to Amzar Camp, fairly close to the airport, where we would spend the night. People in other endgangered locations would also go to Amzar camp.
The rationale for
this was that this was the only place which had food, water and beds. However,
it made little sense to most of us as Amzar is a tented camp, with no solid
structures except for a small kitchen and the block of toilets and showers. Nor
does it have a barbed wire perimeter – indeed any perimeter except for a flimsy
fence marking the boundaries – and not everywhere. More
importantly, the camp is located next to Gabriel Tang's and SAF barracks -- a
key military target. But that is where we were taken.
We arrived around 21.00 and were given a cot with a blanket in a five-bed tent.
We were given a bottle of drinking water but told there was no food. And, as
the fighting simply intensified – with some heavy shells falling in the
vicinity of the Governor’s office and the UNMIS compounds, we were told it best
to lie on the floor next to, or under the bed rather than in bed. Although I
was not aware of it at the time, we were basically caught in cross-fire
with the kitchen and a number of cars receiving bullet hits.
Nonetheless, the next
morning, things seemed calmer. I got up at 6
a.m. and had a hot shower. (That was a nice surprise -- that the
ladies’ shower was relatively clean and the water was hot.) On the radio, I heard that there was fighting
close to the airport. Nonetheless, breakfast was served – with Amzar (a
catering company) living up to its reputation for appalling food quality. We
got a bread roll, a pancake with treacle syrup, and a hard-boiled egg, and tea
or coffee – for 2000 dinars (or US $10.00). The accommodation was, allegedly,
going to cost us US $65/night – I never paid and UNMIS and Amzar will have to
sort that out, while lunch, which cost 3000 dinars ($15.00) was rice, macaroni,
lasagne, pizza, potatoes and bread and some rice pudding – I kid you not!! And
dinner a variation on the above. We did get one briefing after lunch - but it was not very informative and became
somewhat confrontational when an NGO raised questions about how safe we were.
“If you don’t feel safe, you are welcome to leave,” was the response they got.
So the day went by. The
camp is pretty bleak – there is not a tree for shade or anywhere to sit except
the dining room. But, I took a chair outside and, fortunately, I had a novel
with me and was able to read for a good part of the day. There wasn’t too much
shooting although we would occasionally hear a burst of machine gun fire. A
UNDSS (Security) flight came in to do an assessment but we had no first hand
information of what was being discussed. That, in fact, was the worst of it -- that
we were essentially kept in the dark about developments. Over 140 staff were relocated to Amzar but there was only one
security officer with us – Josiah -- and, over the 3 days, we received only two
security briefings. There was no understanding of who was in control.
Information, which was received by different staff members through direct
contacts with people in Malakal by private telephone, contacts with staff at
UNMIS office, or on radio VHF, was passed on by word of mouth. We had little knowledge about what triggered the fighting –
how many injured there were – how many killed. Apparently, there were two
major fronts in the battle, one at the General SAF headquarters, in the south
eastern sector of Malakal, and the other in the general direction of the
airport in the northern sector (near our camp). We heard, at one point, that
SAF HQ had been captured by SPLA. That SAF was now fully engaged in the
fighting.
What I learned I
heard on my radios – which fortunately was fully charged. It was also a source
of amusement as with the message that “Khartoum
was very concerned about us in Amzar and that we would be evacuated at sometime
today.” It was through the radio that we found out that Gabriel Tang had been
given an ultimatum by SPLA (actually, by the Government of Upper Nile State) – that he was to leave town “or else” – and
that he would be flown to Khartoum
by the UN. And, he did leave, at 17.30,
via Kadugli, though there were some tense moments when he arrived at the
airport with a 10-man armed guard who insisted on being permitted to take their
weapons onto the plane. The apparently normal compromise was reached whereby
they could take their weapons, if they were separated from their ammo. There
had also been expectations that Thomas Mabor (who had been included in the same
expulsion decree) might also be flown out, but that did not happen.[1]
As soon as the plane
with Gabriel Tang took off, instead of ending the fighting, it resumed with a
fury. So we went back to our tents to
hunker down for another night after a security briefing where we were informed
that the tents were safer for us than the kitchen because it was not wise for
everyone to be concentrated in one location. The generator cut off – or was cut off – at
some point and that set off the smoke alarm in our tent – so it was not a
comfortable second night. But then, around 22.00 – as the shelling became
particularly loud – someone came round the tents and told us to all congregate
in the kitchen. So we all crowded into this little room and sat on the floor,
in the dark, including quite a few members of our protection team with flak
jackets and blue helmets. After about half an hour, the Indian commander came
in and lectured us on how we should not be using or radios or thoria phones to
communicate with others outside the camp on how bad the security was inside – and
that we were not being properly protected. That was just destroying morale he
said and we should leave the security to those who knew how to deal with it. We
were then sent back to our tents to spend the rest of the night on the floor –
with firing heavy and continuing through the night. I did manage to doze in and
out of sleep. One of the women sharing our tent – Julia, a Sudanese – swore
that a man had come in during the night and pawed her. But that she screamed
and he ran out. Maybe, maybe he just got lost in the dark. Someone in the next
tent – a male tent – snored very loudly all night long, totally unaffected by
the shooting. In the morning, we learned that we had been in cross-fire with
the kitchen and several cars having been hit by bullets.
During the night, on
the radio, we heard that there were a lot of people who had come to the gate of
the TCC (Troop Contributing Countries) camp – wanting to get to the hospital
there -- and the Indians were trying to prevent them from entering, afraid that
the SPLA might think they were harbouring SAF. But to refuse entry to
wounded people is surely a violation of
the Geneva Conventions. Later I learned there were maybe 150-200 casualties,
mainly military, but some civilian – fortunately, none of our people.
The next morning, we
found that Amzar staff had gone on strike – because there were no plans to
evacuate them -- and there would be no breakfast – and, in any event, they
claimed to have run out of food. So we pooled resources - Diane and I both had some food we had
brought with us. A mango, an avocado, (the papaya we had eaten the first night
when we were still in the UNMIS HQ), some digestive biscuits, a can of tuna,
some peanuts, dried apricots, some cereal bars. That became both breakfast and
lunch – shared amongst whoever was around. It was kind of sad when one of the
pilots put some treacle on a plate and lapped that up because he needed some
nourishment. Although, at around 14.00, Amzar relented and served some rice
topped with stew, which we all wolfed down, not sure when we’d get fed again.
So we sat around. One of the staff had found a tiny kitten the day before,
perhaps one or two days old, and Diane de Guzman spent a good hour or more
trying to get the kitten to suck some milk made out of powder in the hope we
might keep it alive. I rather doubt it survived, although the plan was to
evacuate it to El Obeid if and when that
happened. By that time, they had asked us to sign up for where we wanted to be
evacuated to – Juba, El
Obeid (for on to Khartoum)
or Rumbeck. And, at around 15.00, they called all UN agency folk and NGOs to
get ready to evacuate to the airport. UNMIS staff would go later.
So, hot and sticky
and sure that nothing much would happen, I went to take another shower. And, as
I was just about to shampoo my hair, there was a lot of noise and commotion
around and I thought it might not be such a good idea. I got out driping wet, pulled
on my clothes, and went out to see everyone running – so I did too. Back to my
tent – quickly repacked my few things – and ran to jump on a truck to go to the
airport in a convoy. It was clear that the road to the airport, as the airport
itself, was still under the control of SAF – and safe soldiers were very
evident as drove to the airport. There,
some boarded a plane for Ed Obeid. For those of us who opted for Juba, there was an Anotov cargo plane – the large Russian
planes SAF uses for bombing in Darfur – and we
piled into the belly of the plane. No seatbelts – no seats – on this one. We
were about 120 people on board when we left. The flight lasted one hour.
Someone had an asthma attack, but there were doctors on board who dealt with
it. And, then – at 19.00 -- we were back in Juba.
Home!!
A small UNMIS
contingent remained in Malakal, along with the peacekeeping forces, the UNMOs
(UN Military Observers) and the police – who were not evacuated -- where
fighting continued. In the assessment of the Sector Commander, the SPLA had taken the offensive,
apparently determined to take control of the town and to rid itself of the OAG elements in Malakal, but found itself
locked into direct combat with SAF, which was unexpected.
As a result of the fighting on the night of Nov 27, in
which SPLA JIUs clashed with Gabriel Tang’s elements in Malakal, the sector Commander
convened an emergency AJMC, to address the issue. The strong statements by the
SPLA representative [see part of the Nos.
5-7 points in the AJMC minutes below] indicated a determination to by SPLA
forces in Malakal to utilize their JIU command to “clean up” the town of these
destabilizing elements.
Excerpts from the AJMC minutes:
5. The
SPLA member brought out that nothing concrete has emerged out of the numerous
attempts to arrive at a solution to the issue in the recent past. He was of the
view that the presence of Maj. Gen Gabriel TANG in MALAKAL town will be a cause
for insecurity. He claimed that his counterparts from SAF are also blameworthy
since Maj. Gen Gabriel TANG alone cannot disturb the peace. He referred to the
incident of 03 days back when 02 x SPLA soldiers and 02 x women were injured in
a firing incident he alleged was carried out by troops of Maj. Gen Gabriel
TANG. His men also did random shooting in the town to cover up the incident as
also try to connect the issue to alleged rape. Yesterday again they sent the
soldiers to attack SPLA soldiers killing 01 soldier and injuring another. All
these acts of SAF are perpetrating violence in the town.
6. The member further said that even now the SAF
cadres are indulging in random cases of shooting in the East of JALABA area in
MALAKAL. He said that though his presence at the AJMC is indicative of the
intentions for furthering the CPA but he could not comment on the future
strategy the JIU. Southerners are citizens of this town and we want them to
enjoy a peaceful life. The JIU decision to withdraw or remain deployed can only
be taken by their Commander.
7. The SPLA member was forthright in stating that the
situation will not calm down till the Maj. Gen Gabriel TANG is brought to law
and his troops disbanded. He said even the JIU are not acting as a unified
force. The SAF cadres of JIUs are OAGs organized for this and these are the
people who are shooting on the streets. He opined that if SAF failed to view
the issue from the SPLA viewpoint then situation is likely to escalate. He
brought out that SPLA forces will be deployed at all strategic points in town
awaiting orders from higher authorities. They will take action as per orders
received. However, I shall convey the viewpoint of AJMC to the JIU Commander.
3. The JIU command in Malakal, which is currently
being exercised by the SPLA, has forcefully articulated in the AJMC forum that
the responsibility of securing the town fall under its mandate in accordance
with the CPA.
4. The JIU command also has expressed frustrated by
the apparent reluctance of SAF to incorporate its JIU forces to the already
deployed SPLA JIUs in Malakal. Although SAF has already selected and deployed
some troops in Malakal, these forces mostly drawn from former militia elements
have up to now been scattered around Malakal, and are yet to officially join
their SPLA counterparts. It is some of these elements that have been involved
in recent confrontation with SPLA. A good number of these former militia are
strategically based close to the airport.
5.Another major issue of contention is the apparent
reluctance by SAF to hand over its military headquarters in Malakal to the JIU command
as outlined in the Security Arrangements implementation modalities of the CPA.
6. The latest fighting can also be seen in the light
of the recent visit to Juba by GNU president
during which Paulino Matip publicly stated his intention to clear major
southern towns of destabilizing OAG elements. It is widely believed in the
sector that the Nov 27 retaliatory action by SPLA JIU forces against Gabriel
Tang’s elements had been sanctioned by Juba.
Actions by Sector Headquarters
Following the
recent escalation, the sector Headquarters has carried out the following
actions:
1. The HoO presided
over an emergency ASMT meeting to reach some decisions on the possible
relocation of civilian staff from the town based on the prevailing security
situation and in adherence to the laid down procedures. The decisions arrived
at, by senior managers in the Mission
(DDO in Juba and DO in Khartoum) in consultation with the ASMT both
in Malakal, was to maintain the security of Malakal at Level III. This will,
however, involve enhanced steps including downsizing civilian staff that comes
into a not strictly essential category with a ceiling maximum of 50 civilian
remaining behind. At present there are some 150 UN and NGO agency staff,
International and non-Malakal national, eligible for relocation plus 103 UNMIS
civilian staff in the same categories (I.e. total - 253). These do not include TCC, UNMOs and UN
Police, who are not eligible for relocation. A list of staff eligible for
relocation has also been drawn and confirmed.
The decision was
to be implemented as soon as the security situation, in particular the
accessibility of the airport, permits. Under the present circumstances, such
relocation is unlikely to be able to take place in which the airport is
contested, unless a lull in the battle can be achieved to allow for this and
other essential movements to take place.
2. HoO and Sector
Commander presided over the implementation of emergency steps to secure safety
of Mission staff as well as carried out
regular briefings of the prevailing security situation and providing regular
analysis of updates of the security situation with senior UNMIS managers in Khartoum and Juba.
3. HoO and Sector
Commander maintained regular contact and briefing with senior state government
leadership, specifically consultation with the Upper Nile State/Jonglei
Governors.
4. HoO and Sector
Commander Briefed the Vice President of GOSS by telephone on the morning of Nov
29 on the prevailing situation. The Vice President wanted to know the status in
Malakal and indicated he would visit Malakal at the earliest opportunity.
[1] The Upper Nile State Government also
decreed the relocation to Bor (the Jonglei capital) of John Malwit, the
Commissioner of Fangak County, whose appointment is hotly contested by Gabriel
Tang. All three -- Tang, Mabor and Malwit -- were ordered to vacate the town
immediately and UNMIS was requested for air transport to facilitate this
directive. Thomas Mabor, reportedly came as far as the airport, declined to
board the aircraft, ostensibly because UNMIS could not allow his weapons on
board, despite direct interventions by the state Governor. Mabor’s SAF escorts
deliberately encouraged him to stay claiming they would facilitate his
transport to Khartoum
the next day. Owing to logistical difficulties, the relocation of John Malwit
was slotted for the morning of Nov 29, but this has been overtaken by the
current events.
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